Introduction
As the debate on climate change in North America and Europe has heated up, the full voice of the social sciences, for the most part, has not been heard. 1 Indeed, the relatively small representation of academic scholarship in this debate has come predominately from the physical sciences in defining the problem (e.g. ref. 1, 2) , and from one narrow branch of social scienceneo-classical economics -in generating solutions (e.g., ref.
3). Both disciplines focus heavily on the quantitative and "rational" treatments of the climate change issue, rather than on its more qualitative and less rational dimensions (ref. 4, 5) . In our opinion, this focus limits the development of a social consensus around both the reality of the problem and the effective implementation of solutions.
While the physical sciences and neo-classical economics can address issues related to
"what" is at stake and what to do about it, a greater and more varied voice from the social sciences (e.g. sociology, psychology, anthropology, political science, etc.) is needed to address issues related to "how" the problem is accepted by the public and "how" that public will respond to the solutions that are imposed upon it. In fact, behavioural economics (ref. 6, 7, 8) has begun to incorporate research from other social sciences, especially psychology, but even this newest branch of economics under-represents what the social sciences have to offer.
In this paper, we will provide a brief overview of the ways in which a broader array of social sciences can inform the debate over the problem of climate change, and, more importantly help refine solutions. We then summarize these benefits by offering a modified model of problem and solution assessment in risk and science communication (ref. 12, 13) ; one that moves beyond their present focus on the "rational weigher" or "irrational weigher" models for describing social responses to scientific information (ref. 14) . In this paper, we expand upon the "cultural evaluator" model in which individuals do not engage in expected-utility "weighing"
(rational or irrational) of information; but rather use affective and related faculties of perception to discern the nature of the problem and what stance they should adopt toward a particular risk (e.g. climate change, gun control, abortion etc.) (ref. 14) . Affective features, in turn, depend directly on cultural outlooks and commitments. This cultural evaluator model offers several adjustments to current approaches to climate change problem definition and solutions, particularly around the array of communication strategies to be used.
How Social Science Enriches Climate Change Problem Identification
Currently, the problem of climate change is defined predominately as a scientific issue:
anthropogenic sources of greenhouse gases (GHG) are leading to a build-up in the atmosphere, which leads to a general warming of the global climate and an alteration in the statistical distribution of localized weather patterns over long periods of time (ref. 1, 3 Finally, to begin building a social consensus, social scientists would say that the discussion must move away from positions -"climate change is occurring" versus "it is not" -and towards the underlying principles (interests and values) that are at play; that is, towards discussion over the validity of the scientific process, the risk related to the likelihood and impact of action (or inaction), the economic implications of action, and the myriad ideological issues around personal freedom, the proper role and size of government, trust in the free market, and so on (ref. 20, 21) .
In the end, a socio-cultural lens on the climate change debate reveals that the public discussion is not so much about GHGs and climate models as it is about competing ideology, Further, as will be discussed below, a broader view from the social sciences can offer critical insights into social acceptance of solutions that are proposed by neo-classical economics and even behavioural economics -most notably the development of carbon pricing mechanisms.
How Social Science Helps Adjust Climate Change Solutions
Within policy circles, one of the primary solutions to climate change being debated is the use of the market to establish a price for carbon, either through a carbon cap and trade scheme or carbon tax (for review, see ref.
3). While there are many nuances within such schemesincluding tax abatement, supply vs. demand-side focus, mass vs. focused market participation (ref. 28) -all are based on the assumption that the quasi-rational pursuit of self-interest by individuals within a market will not only work best but will maximize net social welfare. To simplify the assumption: if we set a price for carbon high enough, innovators will develop new technologies that emit fewer (or no) GHGs, investors will invest in them, companies will adopt or swap for them (e.g., via emissions trading), and consumers in all parts of the value chain will buy them. 4 While a promising starting point for reducing GHGs, the neo-classical economic approach places too much faith in pricing as a singular solution for altering markets to address climate change and ignores the context in which those prices are introduced and by whom. A broader array of social sciences can be used to adjust this economic solution by incorporating research on perception, decisions, consensus, and action across three levels of analysis: the individual, the organizational and the institutional (ref. 32, 33) . Table 1 below summarizes some of the research and potential insights to augment the economic (both neo-classical and behavioural) solutions to the GHG problem.
----Insert Table 1 about here ---
Individual Level Solutions
A fundamental premise of psychological research on individuals, one drawn upon directly by behavioural economists, is that people attempt to act rationally on their own behalf, but are bounded in their ability to achieve "pure" instrumental rationality (ref. 34, 35 And, people often fail to see common ground in contested debates because they work from the unquestioned assumption that their interests directly oppose the other party's interests, what
Bazerman calls the "mythical fixed pie" (ref. 43) ; what is good for the environment "must" be bad for the economy, and vice-versa. This is exacerbated when the other side is viewed as the enemy, which is common in environmental contexts.
As a result of these complex forms of self-interest and deep self-reinforcing biases (among many others), individual-focused solutions will often, unwittingly, end up creating a "tragedy of the commons" (ref. 44) in which individuals in the short term will consume at unsustainable rates. For example, GHGs may unwittingly be increased in the short run through the emissions rates of specific operations in anticipation of the extension of carbon legislation and the tightening of cap regulations, either of which might increase not just the cost for emitting carbon but also the price for selling it (ref. 28, 29) .
Fortunately, social scientists have had some success at demonstrating that these heuristics can be corrected (ref. 45, 46 
Organizational Level Solutions
When economists advocate the pricing mechanisms for GHG control, the organization is presumed to be represented by individual decision makers and follow similar market logics.
Even behavioural economists tend to make this assumption, although there is a nod in the literature to the work on organizational decisions and learning (e.g., ref. One common solution to this problem is the creation of pooled routines, feedback and reward systems (e.g., via "performance adjustment") in complex, rule-driven organizations (ref. On the one hand, the carbon-cap-and-trade market may be framed as a strategic "threat" by a firm (e.g. what some code as "cap-and-tax"), because the scheme exposes the technology of that firm to an expensive overhaul of the production machinery. On the other hand, the scheme may be seen as an "opportunity", because the firm now has the choice to invest in new technology and receive carbon offsets in the future to reduce that amortized cost -or to continue with its current production process but swap emissions credits with less polluting firms (ref. 69) . Progressive companies are working with the framing of language to encourage change. For example, as part of their GHG reduction strategy, the Whirlpool Corporation avoids using the words "climate change," preferring instead to remain focused on "energy efficiency,"
an issue on which it has been engaged for decades (ref. 70) . By using careful framing and language, change agents within companies can get their organizations to act in their own selfinterest, even non-progressive ones.
Institutional Level Solutions
Neo-classical economics acknowledges the importance of formal institutions as a means of providing the infrastructure for the efficient operation of markets (e.g., ref. that the formal regulatory framework worked in Ireland is that it fit well with its normative institutional dimensions. Ireland has no plastic bag manufacturers to mount an organized opposition; there was no problem of leakage from neighboring countries or states that did not have a similar tax; almost all grocery markets are parts of chains that are highly computerized with cash registers that already collect a national sales tax, so adding the bag tax involved a minimum of reprogramming; and the country has a young, flexible population that has proved to be a good testing ground for innovation, from cell-phone services to non-smoking laws. In fact, the country was primed for change having just shifted from the Pound (or Punt) to the Euro; and people generally didn't mind paying the tax as the litter from the bags was seen as a common nuisance. In the end, a social norm developed to accompany the tax that framed anyone using a plastic bag as rude, with violators being treated much in the same way as someone who did not curb their dog (ref. 79 ).
Finally, the cognitive (or cultural) dimension of institutions refers to the taken-forgranted beliefs to which organizations and individuals will abide without conscious thought (ref. 
The Cultural Evaluator Model and US Climate Change Policy
By now it should be clear that social scientists have many concepts and models that can augment and adjust neo-classical and behavioral economic models of markets for reducing
GHGs. As a way of focusing these contributions, we elaborate the "cultural evaluator" model as a simple framework that can be used, particularly by policy analysts (ref. Thus, the three levels discussed in Table 1 become important for both understanding individual behaviour and for adjusting it.
Augmenting Policy
It appears that policy makers are coming around to a similar conclusion about the need for a broader, more behaviourally grounded approach to policy on climate change. The National
Research Council (ref. 24 ) concluded that there is ample evidence from the social sciences to suggest that a price for carbon alone will not likely be sufficient to accomplish all programmatic goals.
"Even in the best of worlds, a GHG pricing system does not lay the foundation for all aspects of the necessary changes for responding to the threats posed by climate change. In fact, regardless of how 'perfectly' a greenhouse gas pricing system is structured, it will likely encounter specific structural problems that require remedy through a portfolio of complementary policies." (ref. 24: 16) Overall, in the opinion of policy makers, the social sciences are needed to help fill six policy gaps in climate policy: 1) to address temporal considerations, 2) to overcome market organizations to use green marketing (e.g. via heavier rebates and credits for repaired green products) will encourage at least one arm of complex manufacturing and distribution organizations to provide end-consumers with necessary information. Regulatory regimes that create sets of standards to support green marketing will encourage green marketing strategies at the firm level, which will cascade down to the individual level. The same is true for normative belief in business that "green" will sell and the cognitive mind-set that "green strategy" is one viable option for the firm (ref. 65).
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A Final Irony
Unfortunately, beyond the lack of connection between policy-makers and social science research on climate change, we social scientists suffer from our own institutional constraints that undermine our ability to make a difference. As noted recently by American Sociology Association President, Michael Burawoy, the rules of the Academy (e.g. tenure and promotion)
are based primarily on the publication of top-tier academic journal articles in already established social science topic areas, areas which do not include topics like climate change, environmental management, and the politics of technology adoption (ref. 86) . At the same time, publishing in practitioner journals, writing practitioner books, speaking at practitioner conferences -even serving on government panels -are discouraged as being "anti-intellectual" at worst, and as "impractical" wastes of time at best (ref 87). Thus, the lenses of social science need to be turned not only on the climate change debate and its current solutions, but also on itself in order to forge new academic institutions that will help contribute to social debate over climate change problems and solutions. One of the ultimate ironies about the climate change debate is that many of the 5 The advisory committees of the National Research Council and the Department of Energy, like those in the Environment Protection Agency (EPA), are only one part of the policy formation group that is affecting the climate change approaches to pricing. While these two examples represent the government-sector, white-paper, positioning arm for policy adjustment, they do not represent the array of corporations that are engaged in GHG emissions and the political action groups around these firms. • Soliciting underlying cultural norm of "fairness" and distribution.
• Doing dross-cultural comparisons of norms.
Bounded rationality • Using simplified, "adequately accurate" models.
• Training and education in specific environmental management contexts with biases using decision heuristics. Multi-modal goals
• Using of multi-item bargaining in environmental context. • Creating a "package" or portfolio of environmental outcomes.
Organizational Loosely Coupled Structures
• Recognizing the central nature of loose coupling and ambiguity • Using feedback routines across segments.
• Working with decentralized solutions.
Multiple Identities
• Basing appeals on identity.
• Tailoring programs to identities not segments or markets. Unique Languages
• Studying corporate environmental languages. Using firm's own rhetoric for strategy formulation
Institutional
Regulatory domains • Recognizing that regulatory systems have formal and informal sides -anticipating and adjusting to unintended effects. Normative frames
• Accepting in a deep way that underlying societal norms MUST be in place to support a regulatory change.
Cultural cognition
• Recognizing, studying, and adjusting for the deep , taken-for-granted categories and logics in a field 
